As Sunstein points out, in Anglo-American jurisprudence the judge's traditional response to such problems is to avoid confronting them head on, adopting instead a process of incremental reasoning in which previ ous decisions of judges on like questions are taken as,the starting point for resolving the case at hand, the focus is on the particulars of disputes, and legal positions are incompletely theorized in advance.
In Australia, incrementalism has also been identifi ed as the preferred legal method. Thus in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, 5 faced with an argument that the High Court should recognize a new privacy cause of action extending to scenes of possums being stunned and killed in a game meat abattoir, Gummow and Hayne JJ respond as follows: 6
In the present appeal, Lenah encountered . . . difficulty in formulating with acceptable specifi city the ingredients of any general wrong of unjus tifi ed invasion of privacy. Rather than a search to identify the ingredi ents of a generally expressed wrong, the better course ... is to look to the development and adaptation of recognised forms of action to meet new situations and circumstances.
Some scholars and judges have argued that 'top-down' styles of reasoning offer better prospects of effective decision-making in the common law.7 But 'bottom-up' reasoning has certain utilitarian advantages. In a classic article on 'The Science of "Muddling Through"', 8 economist Charles Lindblom observes that, not only is incrementalism the normal approach to administrative decision-making, its reliance on marginal analysis and its focus on results rather than theory reflect a more genuinely pragmatic approach to problem-solving than the alternative 'rational-comprehensive' method. In particular,
The idea that values should be clarified, and in advance of examination of alternative policies, is appealing. But what happens when we attempt it for complex social problems? The first difficulty is that on many critical values or objectives, citizens disagree, congressmen disagree, and pub lic administrators disagree ... Even if all administrators had at hand an agreed set of values, objectives, and constraints, and an �greed ranking of these values, objectives and constraints, their marginal values in actual choice situations would be impossible to formulate.
Unable consequently to formulate the relevant values fi rst and then choose among policies to achieve them, administrators must choose directly among alternative policies that offer different marginal com binations of values. Somewhat paradoxically, the only practicable way to disclose one's relevant marginal values even to oneself is to describe the policy one chooses to achieve them. Except roughly and vaguely, I know of no way to describe or even to understand what my relative evalu ations are for, say, freedom and security ... in government decisions ... than to describe my preferences among specifi c policy choices that might be made between the alternatives in each of the pairs.
Historically, it may be argued, such styles of reasoning, which seek to pro vide 'practical measures for cooperative social life', have much to do with the common law.10 But does this have to change when the law comes under pressure to consider and evaluate human values in a more direct fashionas, for instance, with the new discourse of rights including rights to privacy and free speech? In this essay, I argue that the law has responded effectively to new demands for protection of privacy. And ifjudges have found it dif ficult to deal with rights-based reasoning it is not because the common law cannot accommodate rights -indeed there is a tradition in the law of talk ing about privacy as 'a right'.11 Rather, the difficulty stems from an initial deference to Kantian moral philosophy as the assumed only philosophy of rights. Yet even this may be changing in the latest cases which seem to be coming around to the idea that laws attuned to rights of privacy and free speech still have to accommodate the messiness of the self.
B. Law's incrementalism
In Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2),12 Lord Goff pro vides a classic example of how a recognized form of action, in this case 10 T Grey, 'Freestanding Legal Pragmatism ' (1996) breach of confidence, may be developed to deal with new demands for privacy protection. As the doctrine is elaborated: 13 I start with the broad general principle (which I do not intend in any way to be definitive) that a duty of confidence arises when confi den tial information comes to the knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances where he has notice, or is held to have agreed, that the information is confidential, with the effect that it would be just in all the circumstances that he should be precluded from disclosing the informa tion to others ... I realise that, in the vast majority of cases, in particular those concerned with trade secrets, the duty of confidence will arise from a transaction or relationship between the parties ... But it is well settled that a duty of confidence may arise in equity independently of such cases; and I have expressed the circumstances in which the duty arises in broad terms, not merely to embrace those cases where a third party receives information from a person who is under a duty of confi dence in respect of it, knowing that it has been disclosed by that person to him in breach of his duty of confidence, but also to include certain situations, beloved of law teach ers where an obviously confidential document is wafted by an electric fan out of a window into a crowded street, or where an obviously confi dential document, such as a private diary, is dropped in a public place, and is then picked up by a passer-by ...
To this broad general principle, there are three limiting principles to which I wish to refer. The first limiting principle (which is rather an expression of the scope of the duty) ... is that the principle of confi den tiality only applies to information to the extent that it is confi dential. In particular, once it has entered what is usually called the public domain (which means no more than that the information in question is so gen erally accessible that, in all the circumstances, it cannot be regarded as confidential) then, as a general rule, the principle of confi dentiality can have no application to it ... The second limiting principle is that the duty of confi dence applies neither to useless information, nor to trivia. There is no need for me to develop this point.
The third limiting principle is of far greater importance. It is that, although the basis of the law's protection of confi dence is that there is a public interest that confidences should be preserved and protected by the law, nevertheless that public interest may be outweighed by some other countervailing public interest which favours disclosure ... It is this limit ing principle which may require a court to carry out a balancing oper ation, weighing the public interest in maintaining confidence against a countervailing public interest favouring disclosure.
A remarkable feature of the above passage is the subtle 1-vay in which Lord Goff, writing in 1988, moves to re-establish breach of confidence as a privacy doctrine in line with the great nineteenth-century case of Prince Albert v Strange (cited in argument), 14 and away from the (by 1988) com mon understanding of breach of confidence as mainly about commercial and, to some extent, government secrets but only marginally of relevance to privacy. Thus, the particular examples used, of a confi dential docu ment wafted out a window or a private diary dropped in a street, actually had little bearing on the case before the House of Lords, being a govern ment secrets case about the publication in several leading newspapers of extracts from the book Spycatcher written by a former British spy.
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It is clear from these examples -and also from Lord Goff's more general lan guage of 'notice' of confi dence as the basis of liability -that breach of confi dence is being recast in the passage to take on a broader operation than previously had been supposed, in order to deal with the diversity of modern scenarios involving clashes between privacy and the media. But this is still bottom-up reasoning for, in essence, Lord Goff offers a prag matic result-oriented reframing of the law which only marginally tran scends traditional boundaries and is designed with actual, real-life, cases in mind.
What public transport if they want to avoid being overheard, for the doctrine would not assist them. However, in i\1alone v United Kingdom,1 9 the United Kingdom was found to have failed in its obligation to give legal support to the right to privacy enshrined in ArticJe 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 20 So in Francome the decision in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner was distinguished as concerned with a lawful telephone tap. Some commentators construed this to mean that only in cases of otherwise unlawful conduct may breach of confidence extend outside relationships of confidence,2 1 a position still incidentally giving a great deal of leeway to the media. But in Spycatcher Lord Goff brought surreptitious and other improper obtaining within the ambit of breach of confidence by the simple method of analogizing the liability of the person who obtains information with that of a third-party beneficiary of another's breach, which had long been based on notice.
Now it is conventional wisdom that surreptitious or improper obtain ing may give rise to breach of confidence. This was not immediately apparent following Spycatcher. For instance, in Kaye v Robertson, 22 in 1990, Gordon Kaye (star of the 'Allo 'Allo! television series), suffering a ser ious brain injury after a car accident, found his hospital room invaded by a reporter and photographer who 'interviewed' him and took his photo graph for The Sunday Sport. Breach of confidence was not argued and the Court of Appeal seemed unable to address the situation in terms of avail able legal protection of privacy. There were calls for a statutory privacy action,
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although they came to nothing. However, just over a decade later . 28 In 1988 Lord Goff may have been seen as taking a radical and contentious step in opening up breach of confidence beyond relationships of confidence -although there were several older authorities which could be drawn on in support, as Gleeson CJ noted in Lenah.29 But in the twenty-fi rst century, the position advocated by Lord Goff in Spycatcher is accepted as sound authority, with little acknowledg ment that there was doubt even a decade ago.
C. Thresholds versus balances
Another feature of incremental reasoning nicely illustrated by Lord Goff's repositioning of breach of confi dence as a privacy doctrine in Spycatcher is the emphasis given in the third limiting principle to 'balancing' pub lic interests in maintaining confidentiality and facilitating public disclosure. 30 Even at the time of Spycatcher the position that there must be a public interest defence which allows for a weighing of interests was largely accepted as part of the common law doctrine.
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In 'The Science of "Muddling Through "' Lindblom foreshadowed t];iat for policy-makers difficult social choices involving significant and sometimes conflicting values may be best resolved through a process of determining 'preferences among specific policy choices'.
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The approach is actively encouraged by a limiting principle which invites judges to decide on a case-by-case basis precisely where -among those positions advocated by the parties respect ively-the 'balance' of public interests should lie between, say, privacy and free speech. Nor is the principle's importance belied by the other limiting principle posited by Lord Goff, that 'the duty of confidence applies nei ther to useless information, nor to trivia'. 33 For although at face value this qualification might suggest that courts should first consider whether the privacy value is sufficiently important in a particular case to be worth protecting even before moving to a second step of balancing between privacy and free speech, in practice the cases Lord Goff might have had in mind, writing in 1988, were few and far between.
Perhaps the most obvious scenario comes from Church of Scientology v Kaufman, 34 decided in 1972, where GoffJ relied on triviality as a reason to deny an interlocutory injunction to the Church, which was seeking to stop publication of a book written by a disillusioned former adherent criticizing its teachings and methods. The subject matter was declared not worth pro tecting as being 'pernicious nonsense' and 'trivial tittle-tattle'. 35 It may be wondered whether the 'pernicious nonsense' label was more appropriate 30 Spycatcher (n 12) 282 (and see text to n 13). situation was that a former agent, employed to create a desirable public image for the celebrities by selectively channelling their private infor mation through the press, was doing the telling. As Lord Denning MR noted, 'this pop group sought publicity' and their a,gent's function was to 'produce' this 'favourable image, not only of their public lives but of their private lives also'.
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Again, however, the triviality characterization is prob lematic, for the information the Daily Mirror sought to publish and for which it had 'no doubt provided considerable reward' 42 was worth a great deal to it, something to readers, and enough to the claimants to take legal steps to prevent publication. In any event, Lord Denning had another rea son to deny the injunction, being the 'public interest' in correcting a false image by disclosing 'the truth'. 43 There is some attraction in the idea that where an incomplete story is being presented through selective publica tion of personal information the claimant's interest in maintaining the myth should be discounted vis-a-vis the public's interest in knowing the truth on the other side. 44 However, the suggestion here again was that the better way to deal with the limited value to be found in offering legal pro tection to confidentiality in these circumstances was by considering this alongside the value to be found in publication.
The impression that triviality per se was only a minor basis, at best, for denying breach of confidence's protection by the late 1980s is confirmed by other cases where triviality (in the sense of not sufficiently serious or otherwise worthy of protection) might have been invoked. For or vexatious' but Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VG responded that 'I have the greatest doubt whether wholesale revelations of the sexual conduct of an individual can properly be described as 'trivial tittle tattle'. 4 7 So what was left to triviality by the time Lqrd Goff came to view it in Spycatcher? Bearing in mind the above cases it would seem not much. As Lord Goff said, once the threshold of confidentiality and notice is established (with its own standard of reasonable knowledge), 48 the 'far more greatly important' limiting principle is balancing pub lic interests. Thus, notwithstanding the reference to triviality posing a limitation for breach of confidence, Lord Goff accepted that in a very large majority of cases a decision as between values of confidentiality (or privacy) and free speech should be reached through the decision making process that Lindblom ascribes to 'muddling through' -choosing directly among alternative policies that offer different marginal com binations of values. Indeed, the same seems now to have been accepted by courts coming after, notwithstanding the new discourse of privacy as a 'right'. In the immediate wake of the Human Rights Act, bringing the ECHR with its rights to privacy and free speech into UK law, there was some sugges tion that a rigorous threshold should be met before the right to privacy could be invoked in support of a breach of confidence claim. In Lenah, Gleeson CJ suggested that whether 'disclosure or observation of infor mation or conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities' was 'in many circumstances a useful practical test of what is private'. 49 And the Court of Appeal in Campbell adopted and relied on an offensiveness threshold to deny Campbell's claim for breach of confidence.
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But the House of Lords said a claimant need establish only a 'reasonable expectation' of privacy, judged from his or her perspec tive, and where free speech was also in issue the better course was to con sider whether the reasonable expectation of privacy was outweighed by the public interest in free speech 51 -identifying this with the (by then) 47 Ibid 454. traditional approach of Lord Goff in Spycatcher. 52 Thus the Court of Appeal was 'wrong' to adopt a high offensiveness test which led it to hold that Campbell's treatment by Narcotics Anonymous could not be pro tected without 'balancing the competing Convention rights', Lord Hope said.
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And the majority found that on balance Campbell prevailed with her argument that the information was sensitive for a recovering addict (even if she could not complain about disclosure of her drug addiction, given she had publicly lied about it) and that the use of photographs espe cially was unnecessarily intrusive. Her privacy claim may have been rather weak but it was hard to see a stronger free speech argument on the other side. Similarly, the Court of Appeal added in Douglas v Hello! Ltd, 54 it was wrong for the Court at the interlocutory stage to deny the Douglases an injunction against Hello!'s publication on the basis that their privacy interest was merely 'residual' once they sold the wedding rights to OK!.
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They had a genuine privacy interest in deciding what pictures should be published and it was likely they would have succeeded in their breach of confidence action at trial taking into account the limited public interest on Hello!'s side.
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D. Incomplete theorizing
Incomplete theorizing is also a feature of incrementalism, according to Lindblom. This is evident in Spycatcher where Lord Goff talks of balan cing public interests in privacy and free speech, suggesting a vaguely utilitarian calculus but without any extended discussion of the utili tarian reasons why privacy and free speech may be important and how these interests may be reconciled. That, at least, might seem to have changed in the wake of the Human Rights Act. Almost immediately following the Act, judges in the United Kingdom and even Australia began to talk about the right to privacy as a matter of human dignity and autonomy. privacy was being reconceived as a matter of 'inviolate· personality'
-
suggesting a Kantian principle of treating human beings as ends in themselves rather than sacrificeable for the greater utilitarian good.
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No wonder judges looked to establishing thresholds,to be met before the inviolate right of personality could be invoked. A Kantian approach insists that, as Williams says, 'moral obligations ... cannot conflict, ultimately, really, or at the end of the line', moral obligations being 'inescapable'.
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However, with Campbell, courts seem to have reverted to a more utilitarian idea of privacy as a value whose importance in a par ticular case may well only be finally worked out in the balance with free speech and other public interests. Yet, intriguingly, they continue to use the language of dignity and autonomy. So, according to Lord Hoffmann in Campbell: 61 What human rights law has done is to identify private information as something worth protecting as an aspect of human autonomy and dig nity ... [Breach of confidence in the wake of the Human Rights Act] rec ognises that the incremental changes ... do not merely extend the duties arising traditionally from a relationship of trust and confidence to a wider range of people ... Instead of the cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith ... , it focuses on the protection of human autonomy and dignity -the right to control the dissemination of information about one's private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people ...
[Freedom of the press and the common law right of the individual to protect personal information] reflect important civilised values, but, as often happens, neither can be given effect in full measure without restrict ing the other. How are they to be reconciled in a particular case? There is in my view no question of automatic priority. Nor is there a presump tion in favour of one rather than the other ... But when press freedom comes into conflict with another interest protected by law, the question is whether there is sufficient public interest in that particular publication to justify curtailment of the confl icting right.
Is this top-down reasoning? I suggest it provides yet another example of incomplete theorizing, consistent with Lord Hoffmann's language of 'incremental change'. In Campbell, it seems that the right to privacy is tacitly being absorbed into a liberal-utilitarian conception of privacy. Scholars may argue that dignity here has become synonymous with individuality, human fl ourishing and through .. .that social progress 62 -or rather it is being reabsorbed into a utilitarian treatment of privacy for there are traces of the reasoning also in the ancient case of Prince Albert v Strange.
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It may also be posited that, viewed in such a utilitar ian fashion, privacy can never be given automatic priority over other social interests -especially free speech which also has utilitarian value lying in its expressive power, its contribution to democratic debate, and its capacity to generate truth.
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If so, much can be found in common with John Stuart Mill's understanding of a 'right' as simply a sho rt hand expression for talking about an interest which is regarded so highly that 'ought and should grow into must and recognised indispens ability becomes a moral necessity', but which may yet be outweighed in a fuller and final assessment of social interests.
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Much of this positing is merely surmise, however, for little is said about the nature of rights, let alone the right to privacy, in the cases. There was no reference made to Mill, for instance, in Campbell. Rather, in the traditional fashion of common law, as Mill might have said, judges continue to operate chiefly 'by stealth'.
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There is a further implication to the incrementalism being displayed here. Perhaps privacy and free speech are themselves evolving concepts like everything else in the common law, their evolution further catalyzed by their constantly shifting relations inter se. It may be that, at its simplest, privacy entails a right to be 'let alone', not to express oneself, as Warren and Brandeis argued in 1890. 67 But in actual cases, privacy and expres sion often go hand in hand, as Eric Barendt points out in an important recent essay.
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And the multiple and various ways in which they may do so are still being discovered. Already we know that privacy encompasses not sharing deeply personal information except with trusted family or friends -as in Argyll v Argyll and Stephens v Avery. 69 Jt also embraces not sharing deeply personal information except with a limited circle of people who are not family or close friends, as in Campbell -and more lately Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd. 70 There, damages were awarded for breach of confidence and privacy after the News of the World pub lished a story on racing boss Max Mosley's participation in regular orgies involving the same secret group meeting in his neighbourhood, usually finishing with a cup of tea.71 It extends as well to a right to share signifi cant intimate moments with a large group of family and friends as well as an even larger group of fans (but subject to limited terms), as in Douglas v Hello! Ltd. And, with the subsequent decision in Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd,72 it potentially encompasses sharing even anodyne intimate moments with close family (and presumably friends) but not the pub lic at large, since in that case the objection made in the name of Joanne Rowling's infant son was to photographs covertly taken of him going out to dinner with his family in Edinburgh. The Court of Appeal refused to strike out the claim (or to limit its reasoning to the protection of infants, although clearly that was a consideration), noting that latitude should be given to privacy claimants to make clear what they wish to have treated as private.
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In none of these cases do judges seem to wonder much why those concerned might choose to insist on privacy -they may not know themselves -except that it is obviously a choice they have made. In short, we seem to have reached a position where the common law of privacy confidentiality accommodates the messiness of the self. Perhaps this is where the story should end. But there is still the question of the future. Will breach of confidence fall into obscurity as privacy takes over, as seems to be anticipated in some recent British cases? Breach of confidence is 'old fashioned\ according to Eady Jin Mosley, as distinguished from a ('new fashioned') privacy claim under Article 8. 74 The reasoning presupposes that the language of privacy is superior to that of confidentiality, being more in touch with modern concerns. But I won der whether even privacy may become an arcane concept as still more modern concerns arise. These can already be sensed in a number of cases that touch on the networked generation's desires to share personal infor mation and refl ections with large numbers of loosely defined friends, or potential friends, while still retaining some residual control. 75 So far courts have resisted suggestions that activities on the internet could be viewed as private, unless effective privacy settings are in place (and it seems that technology is as ineffective in the virtual world as in the real world in supporting privacy, perhaps even more so). Blogging is a 'public activity', said Eady Jin the recent Night Jack case 76 in response to a blogger's claims of breach of confidence and/or privacy on finding his anonymity pierced by a journalist using mostly internet sources to piece together his identity. Equally, conversations on Face book (one of the sources) are in the public domain.7 7 So there was no need to consider whether The Times's expose served any public interest that outweighed the claimant's interest in maintaining control over how much of himself he cared to present to his audience. The language of privacy may seem inadequate to capture what was being sought here. But, is any language perfect? Should we acknow ledge what writers of fiction have long understood, the powerlessness of expression together with the obligation to express? 78 If the common law is to keep up with fresh demands for legal protection, judges -like the rest of us -may have to live with the inadequacy of 'privacy' until something (slightly) better comes along.
